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1. The OECD has launched a series of empirical studies to try to answer the questions identified in
its conceptual analysis of multifunctional agriculture (OECD, 2001). One of these is a study of
multifunctional agriculture in the Netherlands. It should initially answer the three basic questions posed by
the conceptual analysis, based on expert knowledge, literature and ongoing policy and research. These
questions concern: 1) the nature and extent of jointness in agriculture of commodity and non-commodity
outputs (positive externalities of a more or less public good character), 2) the possible occurrence of
market failure to match production to demand for the non-commodity outputs, and 3) institutional options
for creating or supporting a market for the non-commodity outputs. The three questions in full are:
1. Is there a strong degree of jointness in agriculture of commodity and non-commodity outputs
(so that change in one output affects the other) that cannot be altered, for example, by
changes in practices or technologies or by pursuing non-agricultural provision of the non-
commodity outputs (possibly at lower cost)?
2. If so, is there some market failure associated with the non-commodity outputs?
3. If so, have non-governmental options (such as market creation or voluntary provision) been
explored as more efficient strategies?
2. These questions should provide the insights needed to achieve a multifunctional agriculture, as
much as possible led by the market, with a minimum of additional policy interventions. The author is
aware of the fact that this vision of multifunctional agriculture has still not proven itself and is therefore
controversial - even in his own country, the Netherlands (NL). So, as a researcher striving for objectivity,
he cannot subscribe to this vision in advance. But in considering this market-oriented vision as an
interesting option, he may contribute to an analysis of its feasibility by answering the three basic questions
and various subquestions for NL. Besides, the answers may enable him to draw general conclusions about
the actual and potential roles of market and policy in NL concerning multifunctional agriculture, or rather
multifunctional land use in case of de-linked commodity and non-commodity production.
                                                     
* Plant Research International, P.O. Box 16, 6700 AA Wageningen.
41. To what extent is NL agriculture jointly producing commodity and non-commodity
outputs?
3. Before answering this question, the conceptual framework of multifunctional agriculture
provided by OECD is discussed, as far as is necessary.
Relevant concepts of multifunctional agriculture
4. OECD uses a simplified model to show how a farm generates a bundle of commodity and non-
commodity outputs (Figure 1). The fixed inputs (family labour, land and other fixed capital goods) can be
allocated to produce food and other commodities, to provide for commercial services such as farm tourism,
or to provide for non-commodity outputs with a public good character such as natural habitats and
landscape elements (for example ponds and hedges). The latter may not be strictly joint with commodity
production, but they are nevertheless joint products because they are generated from the same pool of fixed
inputs. However, the major use of fixed inputs is for production of food and non-food commodities. For
that purpose the fixed inputs are combined with variable (purchased) inputs based on the available farming
technologies and practices (including relative prices and policies). This production of commodities may be
joint with (indirect) production of non-commodity outputs at every stage of the production process (see
curved arrows) based on common fixed and variable inputs and the use of a wide array of farming
technologies and practices. A jointly produced non-commodity output is called an externality (of the
production of a commodity) if it means an appreciable benefit (positive externality) or damage (negative
externality) for persons not, or not fully, involved in the decisions to produce the commodity. The basic
problem is that a commodity with a positive externality tends to be under-provided because the market
does not incorporate the benefit to society. If the commodity is joint with a negative externality, then over-
provision is likely. Producers of the commodity set the level of production at maximum profit while a
higher or lower level of production might be necessary to maximise social welfare. So there is a divergence
between producers’ interests and society’s interests. Policies to correct this “market failure” basically
require that producers be given incentives to incorporate the benefits into their decision-making process
when producing the commodity, or be taxed (or regulated) to incorporate the costs. In this case, an
externality is “internalised”.
Figure 1. A schematic representation of economic activities on the farm
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55. One of the most effective ways to discuss the divergence between producers’ and society’s
interests is through the concept of private and social costs. Private costs are the costs that producers incur
to produce a commodity that is joint with an externality. Social costs are obtained by subtracting the social
benefits of the positive externality from the private cost (or by adding the social costs, in the case of
negative externalities). This reflects the true cost to society of producing the commodity when there is an
externality. (Net) social costs are, therefore, lower than private costs if the externality is positive. Both
private and social costs are usually expressed in marginal terms. Private (marginal) costs are the costs
required to increase production by one unit while social (marginal) costs are the difference between the
private (marginal) costs and the (marginal) benefits of the externality (if it is positive) resulting from the
increase by one unit of the product generating the externality. The two costs can be illustrated by a graph
showing the relationship between the price and the quantity of the commodity in question (Figure 2).
Figure 2. Under-provision of a commodity with a positive externality
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6. The market equilibrium lies at the intersection of the private cost curve and the demand curve of
the commodity. However, a socially optimal point would lie at the intersection of the social cost curve and
the demand curve of the commodity. In case of a positive externality (Figure 2), the commodity should be
produced in greater quantity than the market equilibrium because the true cost of producing the good is
smaller than that which producers face (i.e. the private cost curve). To obtain the alternative figure
illustrating over-provision of a commodity with a negative externality, the curves of private cost (with
market equilibrium) and social costs should just change places in Figure 2. With this brief reference to the
OECD framework, the four sub-questions under the first question can be answered for NL-agriculture.
1.1 What physical linkages exist between commodity outputs, non-commodity outputs and negative
externalities in current agricultural activities? Do these linkages depend on production levels of the
commodity output, technologies and structures, and other factors? Do spatial factors affect the physical
nature and degree of possible jointness?
7. Agriculture in NL involves five main activities with a wide range of commodity outputs. They
are listed in Table 1a, in diminishing order of share in a bundle of six main non-commodity outputs. Dairy
farming has all six and arable farming has three, though to a lesser extent. Horticulture out- and indoors
and pig and poultry farming have only two non-commodity outputs: food security and rural employment.
Horticulture and stable husbandry of pigs and poultry together use only 10% of national farmland.
Therefore they do not have the other four non-commodity outputs, which require lots of land. In Table 1b
the five main activities are listed in the same order. Of the bundle of seven main negative externalities,
6dairy farming has six, arable farming four, horticulture out- and indoors each have three and pig and
poultry farming have five. The overall picture (Tables 1a and 1b) seems complicated, but for each main
activity it will be clear that the linkages between commodity- and non-commodity outputs and negative
externalities are based on a limited number of factors. Also, it will be clear that intensification of
commodity production implies increasing negative, and decreasing positive, externalities. So overall, social
costs have increased with production levels and initial positive jointness probably has even turned
negative. However, only the tendency of jointness can be estimated. The actual state of joint production
cannot be estimated: it is probably impossible to estimate the social costs or benefits of the single
externalities at current production levels and subsequently to calculate the sum of positive and negative
externalities with sufficient accuracy.
Table 1a. Main farming activities in NL with joint production of commodity
and non-commodity outputs
Main activities
(gross production
value in billion Euro)
Dairy farming
(4.4)
Arable farming
(2.1)
Horticulture
outdoors
(3.2)
Horticulture
indoors
(4.0)
Pig and
poultry
farming
(3.9)
Commodity
Outputs
dairy, beef Potato, sugar beet,
vegetables, cereals
flower bulbs,
trees, shrubs,
fruit,
vegetables
Flowers, pot
plants,
vegetables
pig and
poultry meat,
eggs
Linkages to 6 main
non-comm. Outputs:
a. Food security
(% self-supply) a. milk 80, butter 150, cheese 320,
beef 170
a. potato 140,
sugar 190, cer. 25,
veg. 260
a. veg. 260,
fruits 60
a. veg. 260 a. pig 270,
poultry 210,
eggs 250
b. Employment1): b. 110 000 (at least 12 hours /week) b. 35 000 b. 45 000 b. 50 000 b. 25 000
-share in nat. empl.
(total of agr=3.6%)
- nat.1.5% Nat. 0.5% nat.0.6% nat.0.7% -nat.0.3%
-share in rural empl.
(total of agr. =27 %)
- rural 11% - rural 3.5% -rural 4.5% - rural 5% -rural 2.5%
c. Agro-historical
landscape
c. pastures, ditches, hedges, farm
buildings
c. arable fields,
ditches, farm
buildings
d. Environment for
rural recreation
d. in addition to c.: openness,
quietness, silence (1.2 million ha,
included 0.2 million ha of maize for
silage)
d. in addition to c.:
openness, quietness,
silence (0.6 million
ha)
e. Natural habitats
and biodiversity
e. pastures for migratory birds
(a.o. more than a million geese)
f. Ground- and
surface waters
management
f. pastures (1 million ha), ditches
(100 000 km)( scope is limited
because of intensive grazing)
f. (no scope because
of intensive
cropping)
Source: data from LEI-DLO, RIVM and CBS, 2000.
7Table 1b. Main farming activities in NL with production of commodity outputs
and negative externalities
Main activities Dairy farming Arable
farming
Horticulture
outdoors
Horticulture
under glass
Pig and poultry
farming indoors
Commodity outputs Dairy, beef Potato, sugar
beet,
vegetables,
cereals
flower bulbs,
fruits, trees,
shrubs, vege-
tables
flowers, pot
plants,
vegetables
pig and chicken
meat, eggs
Linkages to 7 main negative
externalities:
a. Environm. Pollution by
excessive mineral inputs in
manure on feed and cash crops:
-share in N excess input
 (total =45%2)
-share in P excess input
(total=30%3)
a. Feed import for more
and higher productive
cows than own feed
allows, so excessive
manure on own feed
crops:
- cattle 30%
- cattle 15%
(a. use of pig
and poultry
manure)
(a. use of pig
and poultry
manure)
a. Import of most
feed, so most
manure goes to
land-based activities
- pigs 10%,
poultry 5%
- pigs 10%,
poultry 5%
b. Acidification of natural
habitats by ammonia
volatilisation4
-share in national acidification
(total of agr.= 45%)
b. Ammonia emission
from stables and slurry
injected in the land
-cattle 30%
b. Ammonia
emission from
stables and slurry
injected
-pigs 10%
-poultry 5%
c. Desiccation of natural
habitats (0.6 million ha)
(agriculture causes 60%)
c. intensive drainage of
grass and maize land to
maximise period for
growing and grazing
c. intensive
drainage of
land for max.
prod.
c. intensive
drainage of
land for max.
prod.
d. Environm. Pollution by
pesticides on feed and cash
crops:
-share in total input (act.
ingredients 6025 ton,
disinfectants excluded))
d. silage maize 7% d. total 63%:
-pot. 40%
-s.beet 7%
-cereals 7%
d. total 25%:
-flower bulbs
14%
-fruits 9%
d. total 5%
e. Global warming by
greenhouse gases5:
-share of nat. emissions (total of
agr.=11%, electricity excluded)
e. CH4 from rumen and
N2O from manure and N-
fertiliser
-cattle 6%
e.N2O from
manure fert
-total 0.5%
e. CO2 from
heating
-3%
(lighting
excluded)
e.N2O from manure
(from stable and
land)
- pigs 1%
-poultry 0.5%
f. Environm. Disturbance by
ugly and smelly buildings, light
emission
f. 10 000 ha
of
glasshouses
f. 10 000 ha of
stables, scattered
over the country
g. Reduction of animal welfare g. the more production
efficiency, the less
chances for natural
behaviour of the animals
g. the more
production
efficiency, the less
chances for natural
animal behaviour
Source: data from LEI-DLO, RIVM and CBS, 2000.
8Dairy farming
8. This is the main activity in NL in terms of land use (1.2 of 2 million ha farmland), gross
economic output and share in rural employment. Its focus is on cheese production, as appears from the
320% self-supply figure. Though only 1 million ha of grassland is available, much cheese still can be
produced for the lucrative export-markets by using highly productive cows (8 000 kg milk/year on
average) and providing them with a rich diet including nutritious roughage and an ample quantity of
imported concentrates. Most of these concentrates originate in the United States, Latin America and other
European countries and are imported through the harbour of Rotterdam. As a result, dairy farms have 30-
50% more cows than their own feed production would allow and generate excess manure. This excess
cannot be recycled properly by arable farming and horticulture, since these enterprises prefer to recycle the
excess from practically landless pig and poultry farming. So the export success of Dutch cheese has led to
an oversized dairy herd, largely dependent on feed import and producing a large excess of manure.
Therefore, the oversized dairy herd is the main agronomic cause of nitrate and phosphate-based water
pollution and ammonia-based acidification of weakly buffered natural habitats. It is also the main
agronomic cause of desiccation of natural habitats by intensive drainage and of global warming. The latter
conclusion is based on the emission of methane, 21 times as big a contributor to global warming as carbon
dioxide. In spite of these negative externalities due to intensification and scaling- up during the last
decades, dairy farming still has four major non- commodity outputs, based on its almost 2 million ha of
pastures, which are intersected by more than 100 000 km of ditches. It also still has many thousands of km
of hedges (Table 1a). However, scaling- up and intensification have strongly reduced the levels of non-
commodity outputs. The loss in agro-historical landscape cannot easily be restored. But the remaining non-
commodity outputs can still be restored to their former levels by de-intensification of dairy farming,
leading to less commodity output per ha. Water management would benefit from less drainage, allowing
the water table to rise in winter. This would provide for sufficient water in summer and would make the
uptake of water from elsewhere and irrigation redundant. However, it would also reduce the period of
grazing and mowing and thus commodity output per ha. Since dairy farmers are not compensated for this,
they cannot de-intensify drainage up till now so as to benefit water management, notably of regional
wetlands. For the same reason they cannot reduce the fertilisation of the grassland and the intensive
grazing and mowing. Higher water tables would benefit flora and fauna, notably the migratory birds that
breed in summer (RIVM and DLO, 2000). Subsequently, through restored biodiversity, the grassland areas
would also be restored as an environment for recreation. So the intensification of commodity production in
dairy farming has led to increasing net social costs, both by increasing negative externalities and
decreasing positive externalities. But, by de-intensification, the jointness in production (including the sum
of negative and positive externalities) could be made (more) positive again.
Arable farming
9. This is the second main land using activity (0.6 of 2 million ha farmland), but by far the smallest
in gross economic output. Its share in rural employment is also relatively small. For food security it is more
important, notably for its ample supply of potatoes, a favourite staple food for the Dutch besides cereals.
The supply of cereals is only 25% of domestic demand, as the milling and baking industry prefers foreign
cereals. So the inland cereals, soft and low in protein are mainly used as feed for poultry and pigs. The
main reason why arable farmers still grow cereals is their indispensable role as a break crop in the short
rotations with sugar beet, potato and vegetables as cash crops. Sugar beet is still a cash crop owing to its
effective protection by the EU through domestic production quotas and import quotas imposed on much
cheaper sugar from cane. However, the main cash crop is seed and ware potato and, in the north-east of
NL, starch potato. To maximise production and economic output, this crop is frequently sprayed against
late blight (Phythophtora), an air-borne fungal disease. As a result, intensive potato production is by far the
main cause in NL of environmental pollution by pesticides. Together with sugar beet, it is a major cause of
desiccation of natural habitats by intensive drainage. In spite of its various negative externalities due to
9intensification, scaling-up and specialisation during the last decades, arable farming still has three major
non- commodity outputs, based on its almost 0.6 million ha of fields intersected by more than 50 000 km
of ditches (Table 1a). However, the intensification of commodity production in arable farming has led
increasing net social costs, both by increasing negative externalities and decreasing positive externalities.
But by de-intensification the jointness in production can be made (more) positive again, though the loss in
agro-historical landscape can only partially be restored.
Horticulture outdoors
10. This activity uses 70% less land than arable farming, but generates 50% more gross economic
output with a higher share of rural employment. Fruits are losing importance, because foreign producers
have cheaper land and labour. Vegetables remain competitive and flower bulbs are expanding, owing to
progress in technology enabling replacement of expensive labour by machines (mechanisation). Also,
flower bulbs, trees and shrubs are expanding markets. So, horticulture outdoors is increasingly dominated
by non-food production. Fruits and flower bulbs need intensive protection by pesticides and therefore are
the main causes of environmental pollution by pesticides. In this sector also, intensification of activities has
led to increasing social costs, by both increasing negative externalities and – in marginal terms –
decreasing non-commodity outputs (food security and rural employment).
Horticulture indoors
11. This covers some 10 000 ha with glasshouses. Though this is less than 0.001% of the dairy
farming area, it almost equals dairy farming in gross economic output. Horticulture indoors already
generates more economic output and a higher share in rural employment than horticulture outdoors. As in
horticulture outdoors, non-food production is rapidly expanding and increasingly dominant. On a per
hectare basis, pesticide use is very high, but since the area is limited, the share of indoors horticulture in
total pollution by pesticides is limited to 5%. Excluding carbon dioxide emitted in the production of the
electricity needed for lighting (no data found), the contribution to global warming of heating the
glasshouses is relatively high (3% of the national and 27% of the agricultural contribution). Also, the
10 000 ha of glasshouses are locally more and more experienced as a disturbance of the landscape and the
night. The latter is caused by intensive illumination of the crops at night, which also illuminates the sky
over a wide area. Also in this sector the intensification of activities has led to increasing social costs, based
on both increasing negative externalities and – in marginal terms - decreasing non-commodity outputs
(food security and rural employment).
Pig and poultry farming
12. Pig and poultry units cover some 10 000 ha. On this relatively small area they  achieve a high
gross economic output, comparable to horticulture, though their share in rural employment is only half.
Nevertheless, the size of these activities creates a self sufficiency of 250-270% in pig and poultry meat and
eggs. This huge export-oriented production (13 million pigs and 100 million poultry) is almost completely
dependent on feed imports from Asia, the United States, Latin America and other European countries
through the harbour of Rotterdam. Since pig and poultry farms are practically landless, their manure is
offered to the land-based activities. Poultry manure is most acceptable for arable farming and horticulture,
because of its high value for fertilisation. Pig manure is of less value for them and is only partially
accepted. As a result, most pig manure is used, together with their own excess manure, by dairy farmers on
maize. So the 0.2 million ha of silage maize in NL is the place where most excess manure is used, or rather
dumped. The maize as a crop thrives well on this excess input of manure, but most of the minerals
accumulate in the soil and leach to ground- and surface- water. As well, pig and poultry manure contribute
a considerable share to global warming by emission of dinitro-oxide from denitrification. Finally, the
10 000 ha of units and silos for feed and manure, distributed all over the countryside, are seriously disturb
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the landscape, including the possibilities for living, recreation and tourism. Of all five main activities, pig
and poultry farming would probably be singled out as the activity with the highest social costs, if a national
inquiry were conducted on this subject.
13. Over all of these five main activities, the linkages between commodity and non-commodity
outputs and negative externalities differ spatially in both nature and degree. In other words: regions
strongly differ in nature and degree of activities and thus in nature and degree of commodity and non-
commodity outputs and negative externalities. For example: dairy farming is in every region but the
highest densities of dairy cows occur on the sandy soils of the South and East. Also most pig and poultry
units occur there. Most glasshouses are in the West and arable farms are concentrated on the sandy clay
soils of the south-west and the middle and the peaty sand soils of the north-east.
14. For a more thorough analysis you are referred to the economic data and expertise of LEI-DLO
and the environmental and ecological data and expertise of RIVM.
1.2 Where there is jointness, have attempts been made to de-link the non-commodity production
from commodity production and how much has it cost? In other words is there any evidence concerning
the cost of changing current farming activities to preserve non-commodity production following a change
in commodity production?
15. Of the six main non-commodity outputs, food security and rural employment are considered first.
Food security was a national priority after the food scarcity and even hunger of the Second World War. It
was a major reason behind NL and five other European countries’ founding the European Community. The
stimulation and protection of European food production have even enabled NL-agriculture to develop into
the second net exporter in the world (export value minus import value). In this situation it is
understandable that no specific policy attempts in NL have been made to de-link food security from
commodity production. Nevertheless, food consumption in NL is becoming more and more dependent on
imports; some 50% of products in supermarkets are already from abroad (20% from outside Europe?). So,
food security in NL and probably also in other EU-countries is spontaneously being de-linked by
consumers replacing domestic by foreign products because they are different, better or cheaper ! Although
agriculture has been an overall success in NL, in the most rural provinces in the North and East and also in
rural communities elsewhere agriculture alone was not able to solve the sometimes high unemployment
problem. Therefore, it has systematically been tried to improve rural viability by enhancing non-
agricultural activities. As a result, rural employment is overall increasingly becoming delinked from
agricultural production. Of course, the gradual reduction of the share of agriculture to 25% at the moment
has only partly been achieved by these domestic policy attempts; probably other factors such as the
development of international and European trade have contributed most to the “spontaneous” development
of non-agricultural activities in rural NL, which further de-links rural employment from agriculture.
16. The serious negative externalities and the uncertain perspectives of land-based agriculture on the
liberalising world markets would be strong reasons to deliberately de-link the four remaining non-
commodity outputs. However, attempts up till now have been quite modest, involving an estimated annual
cost of 1 billion Euro, which is only 0.3% of the national expenditure (Table 2).
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Table 2. Government attempts to de-link land-based non-commodity production from commodity
production in dairy and arable farming in NL (estimated costs per year)
Main attempts to
delink non-
commodity outputs
Payments of farmers for joint production
in specific regions and on specific fields
(costs/year)
Purchase of land for direct non-
agricultural provision of non-
commodity outputs in specific
regions and on specific fields
(costs/year)
Total costs/year
(billion EURO)
main four land-
based non-comm.
outputs:
c. Agro-historical
landscape
c. payments for conservation of valuable
landscapes and farm buildings (0.1)
c. in combination with d. or e. 0.1
d. Environment for
rural recreation
d.in combination with c. or e. 0.0
e. Natural habitats e. payments for various packages of
conservation of natural habitats, notably
for migratory birds to breed in summer or
feed in winter (0.1)6
e. purchase and management of
0.5 million ha up till now and
0.25 million ha more in the
future for an Ecological Main
Structure (0.7)7
0.8
f. Ground- and
surface water
management
f. payments for loss of production by
measures to protect or recharge
groundwater or to enable periodical
flooding (0.05)
f. purchase of strips of land
along water courses and around
water pits for better management
(0.05)
0.1
17. Attempts are focussed on the creation of an Ecological Main Structure (EMS), to safeguard the
great variety of natural habitats and the related biodiversity. Only a small part of this EMS concerns wild
or unmanaged nature such as dunes, marshes and forests. Most of it concerns former woodlands planted for
timber, grasslands for cattle husbandry and heather areas for sheep husbandry. Therefore, the EMS may
also be considered as an implicit attempt to de-link the conservation of agro-historical landscape and rural
recreation from agriculture. Explicit attempts to de-link these two non-commodity outputs have until now
been practically negligible. However, explicit and more ambitious attempts can be expected, considering
the gradual urbanisation of NL and the increasing demand for these non-commodity outputs besides nature.
Firmer attempts to de-link the fourth non-commodity output of agriculture, groundwater recharge and
flood control, can also be expected. There are two major reasons: to avoid negative externalities of
agriculture (desiccation, pollution by minerals and pesticides) and to deal with increasing precipitation as a
result of global climate change. In principle, the four land-based non-commodity outputs can be de-linked
in two ways: partially by direct payments to farmers or completely by purchasing the land for
economically and physically separate production of the non-commodity outputs. As appears from Table 2
both ways are followed in NL, though complete de-linking seems to be preferred in spite of higher costs.
Up till now, the majority of farmers and policymakers prefer separate to joint production. However, the
majority may prefer the reverse if agriculture loses the competition in liberalising markets and not enough
land can be purchased or costs are too high for separate production. Then, both farmers and community
could decide to deliberately join production of commodity and non-commodity outputs again, but in that
case based on explicit demand and directly paid supply (separated from commodity supply).
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1.3 If the production of a non-commodity output has been de-linked from commodity production
have there been effects on production of other non-commodity outputs? What have been the effects on
other non-commodity outputs of attempts to de-link a specific couple of commodity and non-commodity
outputs?
18. The clearest example of de-linking in NL is the provision of natural habitats including
preservation of biodiversity (Table 2). The Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries co-ordinates both
partial and complete de-linking. Complete de-linking involves the creation of the Ecological Main
Structure (EMS) to collect the main existing natural areas, to connect them by special connection zones
and to expand them by developing new natural areas. Currently the EMS covers 0.50 million ha of land: in
2020 it should cover 0.75 million ha. The additional 0.25 million ha should mainly be purchased from
dairy and arable farmers. It mostly concerns farmland lying adjacent to, or between, existing natural areas
and is appropriate or even necessary to strengthen the EMS because of its strategic location and its actual
natural values. The Ministry has assigned the governments of the provinces concerned to delimit the areas
to be purchased, which implies that farmers willing to sell land within these areas should first consider an
offer of the province to purchase or exchange. Of course, it may take decades before a province has
acquired the entire delimited area in this way. In the meanwhile, the transformation of the area from
agriculture to nature has already started by contracting land for joint production of natural habitats.
Farmers may choose a contract from a broad package of joint production couples, varying from slightly
extensified grass production with breeding opportunities for meadow birds to strongly extensified grass
production, including growing opportunities for various wild plants. Also for land around the EMS but
outside the delimited areas for expansion of the EMS, farmers can sign contracts for joint production of
nature. However, these forms of partial de-linking are not considered very cost-effective by most
ecologists. They argue that NL gets a lot more biodiversity for on average 1 000 Euro/ha management
costs of nature areas, compared to the 1 000 Euro/ha compensation for production loss for farmers
extensifying their grassland for flora or migratory birds! Their opinion has made the Ministry up till now
quite reluctant to invest more in so-called agricultural nature. So, national policy focuses on the complete
de-linking of agriculture and nature. As already stated in the response to Question 1.2, expansion of the
EMS to 0.75 million ha in 2020 also means a certain de-linking of agriculture and the other land-based
non-commodity outputs: historical landscape, environment for rural recreation and rural water
management. However, it is doubtful whether bundled direct provision on this scale could meet future
demand, if most of the remaining land-based agriculture is lost to competition and the remaining
1.5 million ha of farmland urbanised or used in other ways that would limit or even exclude additional joint
production of non-commodity outputs.
1.4 Have non-agricultural alternatives of providing non-commodity outputs been explored, or
implemented? Have differences in costs and quality between agricultural provision and non-agricultural
provision been observed?
19. For a long time the four land-based non-commodity outputs have been recognised as public
goods, whose supply is too important for society to base entirely on voluntary joint production by
agriculture. As a result, authorities and private clubs decided to assure sufficient supply of these public
goods in addition to that produced jointly with agriculture. Almost a century ago, in support of  the trinity
of landscape, nature and environment for recreation, the initiative was taken by a club of friends of nature,
called “Natuurmonumenten”. They started to purchase valuable and attractive nature areas and land
properties in 1920 and have since then accumulated 0.10 million ha. Purchase and management are based
on a mixture of gifts, legacies, membership fees and state subsidies (includinggifts from the national
lottery). Later, the Ministery of Agriculture started a second non-agricultural provider, named
“Staatsbosbeheer”. Originally it was the national forestry service, but it has been transformed into a
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provider of nature and recreation environment, with the emphasis on forest management (total area with
and without forests: 0.25 million ha). As well, the 12 provinces each started their own provision:
“Provinciaal Landschap”. Together they manage 0.10 million ha. Finally, various communities and private
persons and parties own 0.15 million ha of nature and historical landscape, to a large extent open to the
public. The role of these private and public providers has been increasingly recognised, along with a
growing awareness that intensification, scale enlargement and specialisation have made agriculture a bad
provider and even a destroyer of nature, landscape and environment for recreation. During the last years a
minority of farmers has been trying to regain people’s appreciation and confidence by voluntary or
directly-paid provision of nature and landscape. As already stated, most ecologists and policymakers doubt
the efficiency of agricultural nature, considering the its cost and quality. So, non-agricultural provision is
still preferred.
20. The fourth land-based non-commodity output of agriculture, management of ground- and shallow
waters has developed in an analogous way. Even centuries ago regional water boards were started to
provide for water management, in addition to joint production by agriculture. Gradually the water boards
have become the main provider, and intensification has changed agriculture from a provider to a consumer
of water management. To face up to desiccation of natural habitats (caused by overdrainage) and
increasing precipitation (caused by global warming), water boards can follow two ways. They can
purchase land from farmers or they can pay farmers for water services including production loss. The same
dilemma is being faced by water companies with draining and polluting agricultural activities above their
groundwater reserves. In general, both water boards and water companies try to provide their services as
independently as possible from agriculture. In other words: they have little confidence in joint production
by modern agriculture.
Conclusion to the first question
21. Yes, there is still a strong degree of jointness in NL agriculture of commodity and non-
commodity outputs. But intensification of commodity production has led to decreasing positive and
increasing negative externalities. So overall, social costs have increased with production levels and initial
positive jointness probably has even turned negative (only a national survey of public opinion can confirm
this estimate). How have positive externalities (or non-commodity outputs) decreased, or de-linked and
negative externalities increased? Historically, NL-agriculture has six major non-commodity outputs.
Supported by national and European policy, agriculture has become so productive that food security as the
first non-commodity output is oversupplied by more than twice the domestic demand. This oversupply is
also caused by a decrease in domestic demand, since consumers increasingly prefer foreign food. So, food
security is progressively being de-linked by consumers themselves! Favoured by the prosperous
development of the European and world economy, but also by deliberate domestic policy, non-agricultural
activities have become even more important than agriculture. As a result, in most rural areas agriculture
has become a minor provider of rural employment. So this second non-commodity output is becoming de-
linked, too. The four remaining non-commodity inputs (landscape, nature, recreational environment and
water management) all require a lot of land. Therefore, historically they have been jointly produced by the
most land-based activities: dairy and arable farming. But gradually their production has been reduced
because of intensification of commodity production, which led to specialisation and scaling-up of
activities, including the destruction of hedges and other natural habitats, canalisation of water courses and
lowering of ground water tables. Moreover, intensification and specialisation have led to increasing joint
production of seven major negative externalities (pollution by excessive manure and pesticides,
acidification and desiccation of natural habitats, global warming by emission of greenhouse gases,
disturbance of the landscape by ugly buildings and light emission, and reduced animal welfare). The
evolution of agriculture from net provider to net consumer (water) and even polluter or destroyer of the
four land-based non-commodity outputs of public good character has led to various private and public
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initiatives of non-agricultural provision. Major initiatives are regional water boards and national
organisations for conservation and restoration of nature and landscape. But the non-agricultural provision
of the four non- commodity outputs is still limited by land. Dairy and arable farmers are still using 60% of
the 3.3 million ha of rural areas (shallow waters included), while water boards and nature organisations can
use only 20%. This situation can only slowly be altered, because the money is not available for purchase of
land on a large scale and the farmers are not willing to sell land on a large scale. So to meet the demand,
the four land-based non-commodity outputs will remain dependent on joint production by dairy and arable
farmers, in spite of increasing non-agricultural production. However, the big problem is to encourage
farmers to de-intensify commodity production, to reduce negative externalities and produce more of non-
commodity outputs.
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22. According to the theory of social welfare, commodities jointly produced with non-commodity
outputs (positive externalities) are likely to be under-provided and commodities jointly produced with
negative externalities are likely to be over-provided (see intro first question). However, it takes a deeper
analysis to assess whether the market really fails in achieving a socially optimum joint production
(Figure 2).
2.1. Are there examples of market failure occurring (or can we predict when they are likely to occur)
following commodity price decreases? In particular, have changes in marginal values of non-commodity
outputs in reaction to changes in commodity prices been observed/measured?
23. Prices of none of the major agricultural commodities in the EU have kept pace with inflation and
cost increases during recent decades, in spite of subventions and market protection against non-EU
producers. So in practice,  European farmers are already used to producing at ever decreasing prices or
more precisely: at ever decreasing marginal benefits! Their reaction is well-known: “we must keep on
saving costs and increasing production both per unit and in number of units”. In this way NL-farmers have
shown to be very competitive up till now, considering their second position behind the United States -
farmers in net value of their exports (exports minus imports). However, the permanent increase of
production needed to remain competitive at ever deceasing marginal benefits has led to increasing negative
externalities (Table 1b). The most clear examples of market failure are presented by horticulture outdoors
and indoors and pig and poultry farming. Apart from an (ever smaller) share in rural employment these
minimally land-based activities have no positive externalities to compensate for their major negative
externalities. So their social costs are clearly higher than their private costs, but the market fails to adjust.
The main reason of this market failure is that most foreign and domestic consumers are not willing to pay
for commodity production with fewer negative externalities (see Question 2.2). Besides, most negative
externalities have increasing marginal damages. This is because ecosystems have a certain tolerance for
negative effects, but beyond a certain limit suffer increasing damage by escalation of damaging processes
(eutrophication, acidification, desiccation, fragmentation of habitats). Under pressure from world trade
negotiations and the entry of new member states, the EU will probably further liberalise its Common
Agricultural Policy. Along with technological and economical improvements this will lead to further
decrease of commodity prices and marginal benefits. Farmers will try to remain competitive in the usual
way by reducing  costs and increasing production per unit and the number of units. Inevitably, they will
produce further negative externalities and further diverge private and social costs, thus aggravating market
failure in NL, unless EU and national incentives effectively may curb intensification of production and its
negative externalities.
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24. Market failure is less evident in the case of non-commodity outputs (positive externalities). The
analysis can be restricted to the four land-based non-commodity outputs, since domestic agriculture has
become a minor provider of food security and rural employment (Table 1a). Dairy and arable farming are
the joint producers of the four land-based non-commodity outputs. These activities also have reacted to the
decrease of marginal benefits by reduction of costs and increase of production. As a result, they have
jointly produced ever more negative externalities and ever fewer non-commodity outputs. The latter is due
to the fact that the non-commodity outputs have opportunity costs, notably land and labour and production
limitations, which farmers must reduce to increase productivity. This intensification of commodity
production has led to ever less and ultimately negative marginal values of the non-commodity outputs.
Nevertheless, various inquiries have shown that the majority of Dutch consumers still appreciate the
management of the countryside by farmers, but prefer recreation in the areas of the non-agricultural
providers, namely the nature organisations. So, agriculture also seems to have reduced the demand for its
joint production of the non-commodity outputs by increasing commodity production to the detriment of the
non-commodity outputs. With the prospect of further falls in commodity prices, to be compensated by
further intensification, it is understandable that the public and policymakers choose more and more to de-
link the provision of the non-commodity outputs. So, if liberalisation of trade reduces the demand for joint
production, and non-agricultural provision is increasing, can we still speak of market failure? Yes, because
consumers are giving clear signs that these outputs are underprovided, which means that non-agricultural
provision isnot sufficiently compensating for the reduction of joint provision by the farmers (see
Question 2.2).
2.2 How has the existence (or otherwise) of market failure been established? What conclusions can
be drawn about the reliability of the valuation methodologies used?
25. The existence of market failure in the case of negative externalities is clearly demonstrated by the
behaviour of consumers. Though they are well informed about the negative externalities of agricultural
products, they seldom switch to products under integrated or organic labels, which are available in most
supermarkets but cost more for having internalised the negative externalities. Apparently, the reduction of
negative externalities cannot be led by the market, because the vast majority of consumers behave as free
riders! The alternative is to drive this reduction by policy, but policy is also failing, as shown by the
increase or insufficient decrease of the negative externalities (RIVM, 2000). The implementation
scheduled for 2003 of the EU-maximum norm for manure input/ha (170 kg manure-N/ha) would lead to a
50% reduction of manure input and therefore a significant reduction of the negative externalities. Since
processing and export of manure are not economically feasible, the manure input can be reduced by 50%
only if livestock numbers are reduced by 50%. This would imply a strong de-intensification of land use,
which would also benefit the provision of non-commodity outputs. So, the EU could support NL-policy to
overcome market failure. However, until now the Ministry of Agriculture has not been willing or daring
enough to sanction joint production so drastically, as can be seen from the fact that it has asked the EU
Commission to raise the norm to 250 kg N/ha.
26. The existence of market failure in the case of non-commodity outputs (positive externalities) is
less evident, though consumers send strong signals of under-provision while farmers decrease rather than
increase their joint production. A major sign of under-provision is the recent initiative of the main
organisations for nature and landscape conservation, recreation and water management in calling for a
national offensive for better protection and more provision of the non-commodity outputs
(www.Nederlandnatuurlijk.nl). They plead for a mixture of public and private efforts, including extra
public investments of 0.5 billion Euro per year until 2010 (besides the current investments of 1 billion Euro
per year as specified in Table 2). Explicitly they call for more joint production by dairy and arable farmers
(the partners of this alliance have detailed information on demand). Theoretically, the failure of the market
to provide the four non-commodity outputs could be overcome by progressive marginalisation of
agriculture, ultimately leading to land abandonment on a large scale. In such a case the negative
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externalities would decrease again and sufficient land would become available for delinked provision of
the land-based non-commodity outputs! As a matter of fact, this autonomous scenario seems to be ongoing,
since almost half of dairy and arable farmers in NL are 55 years or older and have no successor (Vereijken
and de Boer, 2000). Their one million ha can only partly be purchased by other farmers, because of
increasing land prices and decreasing marginal benefits. However, the most likely purchasers of all this
land will not be authorities or nature organisations, but economically powerful private parties, notably
citizens with higher than average incomes. For 300 m2 of land to build a house with a garden they pay now
50 000 Euro. For the same amount they can buy a hectare of farmland! Up till now only speculators have
done so, because in NL it is very difficult to get permission to build a house on open land. However,
political pressure is growing on the Ministry of Housing, Physical planning and Environment to be more
permissive (more on this in the fifth note of physical planning, www.minvrom.nl). So, in the case of
progressive marginalisation of agriculture land will indeed be abandoned but most of it will be taken over
by private parties. This will lead to diffuse urbanisation of the rural areas to the detriment of the four land-
based non-commodity outputs. So market failure will probably continue even if joint production fully
disappears, unless authorities prevent or at least restrict diffuse urbanisation to protect both agricultural and
non-agricultural provision.
27. A systematic and more detailed analysis according to externality agricultural activity and overall
would certainly provide more details on the market failure of joint production. The author assumes the
single NGO’s in the alliance for more non-commodity production have reliable data concerning under-
provision, otherwise they would not join the alliance and risk discontent and even loss of their members!
So the mere fact of the impressive initiative of this broad alliance of NGO’s is considered sufficient
evidence for overall market failure concerning the provision of the four land-based non-commodity
outputs.
3. If the market fails to incorporate non-commodity outputs, are non-governmental options
explored as the most efficient strategy?
28. This final question is answered by responding to its five sub-questions.
3.1. Focusing specifically on the spatial dimension, what are the degrees of excludability and rivalry
in the consumption of certain specified non-commodity outputs?
29. Non-commodity outputs can theoretically be provided and consumed in various degrees of
excludability and rivalry. Based on the theoretical framework of OECD (2001), the most relevant options
of the four land-based non-commodity outputs in NL are presented (Table 3). The options are briefly
highlighted.
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Table 3. Main spatial options for provision and consumption of the four land-based
non-commodity outputs in NL
Non-rival8 Congestible9 Rival
Generally
non-
excludable10
Pure public goods
- landscape, nature and
recreation through the
media
Open access resources
(type II)
- landscape, nature and
recreation from main public
roads and places
Open access resources
 (type II)
- landscape, nature and recreation from
small public roads, paths and places
Spatially
non-
excludable
Regional or local pure
public goods (Type I)
- landscape, nature and
recreation within own region
or community
Socially
non-
excludable
Common property resources
(type III)
- landscape, nature and
recreation in national parks
under strict rules
Common property resources
(type III)
- landscape, nature and recreation in
small public areas (forests, parks,
nature areas) under strict rules
Generally
excludable
(Type IV) Club goods (type V)
- water management by
regional water boards
Private goods
- landscape, nature, recreation and
water management on farms and other
private properties
Agro-historical landscape, nature and environment for recreation
30. The 3.3 million ha rural areas of NL have a rich diversity of geomorphological, archaeological,
geographical and architectural values. Altogether they may be called the agro-historical landscape of NL,
60% of which is voluntarily provided for by dairy and arable farmers and 20% by nature organisations. A
major option for non-excludable and even non-rival consumption is through the media (radio, television,
internet, magazines and newspapers). A second major option for non-excludable consumption is from
public roads and places: however this is congestible and even rival at higher densities of consumers
(‘tragedy of the commons”). A highly-valued option is consumption within the own community or even in
the own neighbourhood. The alliance for the nature offensive signals a strong underprovision, especially in
the densely populated and highly urbanised west of NL (“the Delta-metropole”). On top of the policy-
driven expansion of the Ecological Main Structure, they claim an extra 0.30 million ha (10% of the rural
areas) around the main cities for nature and recreation (Nederlandnatuurlijk.nl). For the consumption of the
20% of rural area owned by nature organisations, the main option is visiting on foot or by bike following
strict rules as appropriate for common properties. Consumers behaving outside the rules are excluded. In
spite of the many strict rules, congestion and even rivalry are quite seriously disturbing consumption and
undermining provision, so even here the “tragedy of the commons” cannot be prevented. It has led to
strong signals of underprovision and substantial claims to increase the percentage of rural areas for direct
provision of natural landscape and environment for recreation. Excludable and rival consumption on farms
(and other private properties) has become a minor option: 95% of farmers focus on intensive commodity
production to remain competitive and maintain their income. So, the strong underprovision of landscape,
nature and environment for recreation cannot easily be alleviated by direct non-agricultural provision, nor
by joint production by farmers (ANWB, the organisation highlighted in Question 3.3 has been charged by
the alliance to estimate the demand for landscape more accurately) .
Water management
31. The western half of NL is less than 1m above sea level, so only dykes and intensive drainage
ensure dry feet for the people and dry land for the farmers. Though the eastern part of NL is at least 1m
above sea level, here also intensive drainage is needed to prevent the precipitation surplus in winter from
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flooding low-sited buildings and land. So water management is a historical necessity for the existence of
NL. Most of the dykes and ditches have been created for agriculture by the farmers themselves. Since the
Middle Ages their management has been gradually taken over by so-called water boards, on behalf of the
community. Through the centuries the water boards have expanded and professionalised their two basic
tasks, protection against flooding and field-wise management of the water table for optimum agricultural
production. Another important task of the water boards has become the discharge and, during last decades,
the purification of waste water. In 1850 there were still 3000 water boards: since then they have merged to
number fifty nowadays. They cover the entire country and are allowed to impose water charges and
purification levies on any local inhabitant. So citizens pay the regional board for providing their safety
against water and for purification and discharge of their waste water. Also, owners of buildings and land
pay for the water management of their property. In practice, farmers pay more than all other citizens.
Because they are the major payers, they have most votes in the boards. Only recently has the dominance of
the farmers started to diminish through a more democratic weighting of the votes. This is justified because
the citizens pay ever more for “integrated water management”, even including management of water
dependent nature and recreation. Though “membership” is obligatory to all local inhabitant, water
management by water boards is best characterised as a “club good”. These goods’ major characteristic is
that they are congestible but also excludable, which enables an optimum balance between provision and
demand. A major challenge is to manage the increasing precipitation caused by global warming. NL must
not only manage its own precipitation surplus, but also that of large parts of Germany, Belgium and
France, which are discharged by the rivers Rhine and Meuse. As well, NL must manage both the
continuous subsidence and salinisation of the peat soils in the West (caused by low water tables for
farming) and a possible rise of the sea level (caused by global warming). Recently a commission for water
management in the 21st century has estimated that at least 60 000 ha farmland is needed to manage the
expected extra water quantities (www.waterland.net.nl). So, NL is also facing an under-provision of water
management to be made up by more non-agricultural provision by the water boards or by more joint
production by farmers. However, intensified commodity production has made farmers a minor provider
with limited scope for water management for non-agricultural purposes, as yet.
3.2. What market creation measures or policy instruments have been put in place to ensure the
required level of supply of non-commodity outputs and to address negative externalities?
32. In the foregoing it has been shown that EU and national policy have encouraged the NL-farmers
to specialise, intensify and scale up activities for a few commodity outputs. This has made NL-agriculture
a major provider of negative externalities and a minor provider of positive externalities or non-commodity
outputs. Politically, this has always been justified because of the provision of the two basic non-commodity
outputs of agriculture: food security and rural employment (rural viability). Though food security has
become strongly overprovided and non-agricultural activities have become the major providers of rural
employment, this agricultural policy still dominates and is still justified in this way. The reduced provision
of the other non-commodity outputs by agriculture is accepted as an inevitable sacrifice to be compensated
by non-agricultural direct provision. Major examples of this compensation policy are the Ecological Main
Structure provided by governmental and private nature organisations and integrated water management by
the water boards. To reduce the negative externalities of intensive agriculture NL policy has adopted the
world-wide objective of sustainable agriculture. This concept is used as a major policy instrument to
reduce the negative externalities without reducing competitiveness and income of the farmers. However,
there is hardly any scope for success of sustainable agriculture in markets that are liberalising since
reduction of negative externalities always leads to higher costs or lower commodity output. Therefore it is
not surprising that policies of NL and other EU countries fail to achieve agriculture that is both competitive
and sustainable, with a significant reduction of the negative externalities. Besides, the compensation policy
for non-agricultural provision of the four land-based non-commodity outputs fails to fill the gap between
demand for these outputs and their supply. An alternative policy would be to reduce negative externalities
and underprovision of non-commodity outputs in one sweep by encouraging farmers to convert from
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intensive monofunctional production to extensive multifunctional (joint) production. This can be achieved
by replacing subsidies and protection of commodity production by direct payments for providing the four
land-based non-commodity outputs. Initially these payments could be made by the EU and the NL-
Ministry of Agriculture (“cross compliance”and “modulation”). Later, nature organisations and water
boards could take over the payment of the farmers by imposing region-wise levies to the consumers of
“regional public goods” or “regional club goods” (“regional population as a club for rural services with
obligatory membership”).
3.3 To what extent have trusts, clubs, voluntary provision by local community groups, consumer
groups, local government been involved?
33. In the foregoing it has been shown that the reduction in joint provision of the four land-based
non-commodity outputs by the farmers is partly offset by direct provision by nature organisations and
water boards. The major land-owning nature organisations have already been described under Question 1.4
and the water boards under Question 3.1. It has also been shown, under Question 2.2, that nature
organisations and water boards are major partners in a broad alliance of organisations of consumers and
providers of the land-based non-commodity outputs. A major partner with almost 4 million members (a
quarter of the population; half of all households) is the organisation for tourism and recreation
(www.ANWB.nl). The organisation started a long time ago as a union of bikers and gradually changed into
a union of car drivers, though it has remained a provider of touristic and recreational services both for
urban and rural areas. The organisation has a strong influence on government policy and a key role in
possible market creation for nature, landscape and water dependent recreation. A major characteristic of
ANWB and remaining consumer organisations in the alliance is that they do not own land for direct
provision of the land-based non-commodity outputs. They can contribute only by pressing the government
to purchase more land from farmers or to pay farmers for joint production. They can also urge their own
members to pay directly for more provision of the non-commodity outputs as “regional public goods” or
“regional club goods”, for example as an explicit part of the levy of the regional water boards.
3.4 What is the relationship between the different institutional arrangements in place and the
characteristics of the non-commodity outputs as pure or impure public goods? In particular, why have non-
governmental approaches not been employed in cases where the nature of the non-commodity output
would have allowed it?
34. The four land-based non-commodity outputs can only virtually (in the media) be considered as
pure public goods. In an urbanising country such as NL this option of provision and consumption is of
growing importance. Nevertheless, a strong demand remains for real provision of the land-based non-
commodity outputs - meeting the demand for more water management is even a matter of life or death. The
majority of politicians and consumers have accepted that agriculture provides an ever smaller share of
these pure and impure public goods, in the expectation that direct non-agricultural provision can
compensate. To arrange the latter is considered a task of the government (national, regional, local), since it
costs a lot of money to purchase and manage the land needed. Non-governmental approaches such as
provision by private enterprises are thought to have little role, since profitable exploitation of the land by
providing a coherent bundle of non-commodity outputs is an illusion if consumers are can free ride on the
payments of others. Where pure governmental and pure market approaches seem to fail, an intermediate
approach may succeed. It implies club-wise provision by regional non-profit and democratically controlled
organisations such as water boards, including joint provision by farmers directly paid from the levies
imposed on all regional consumers of the non-commodity outputs. The advantages of this approach are: the
non-commodity outputs are provided as on demand and as a coherent bundle to anybody in the region
(“multiproduct clubs”), safe from the risks of free riders. The fifty water boards are already the main
providers of water management, which is most significant for the other three land-based non-commodity
outputs and for agriculture. Therefore the boards are most capable of creating coherent bundles of the non-
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commodity outputs, joint with agricultural production as far as needed or possible. Besides, they are most
capable of excluding free riders since they cover the entire country.
3.5. Is there any evidence concerning the stability, equity and international spillover effects of these
arrangements, whether they apply to non-commodity outputs or negative externalities?
35. In the foregoing it has been shown that three of the four non-commodity outputs (landscape,
nature and environment for recreation) are mainly provided by nature organisations, entirely or partly
financed by the national or regional government. The fourth non-commodity output (water management) is
mainly provided by water boards. Altogether, these arrangements cannot compensate sufficiently for the
loss in joint production by dairy and arable farmers. Therefore, it is proposed to restore joint production by
dairy and arable farmers under the supervision of the water boards. In one sweep this would solve the
negative externalities of dairy and arable farming, which are persisting or even increasing notwithstanding
the current restrictive policy based on the concept of sustainable agriculture. The impact of the various
arrangements in terms of stability, equity and international spillover is briefly discussed.
Stability
36. In spite of its large resources and great potential for a creative and effective policy, the central
government of NL is far from a stable provider of public goods. Clear examples are its failure to
sufficiently reduce the negative externalities of agriculture and to compensate for the loss of joint
production of landscape, nature and environment for recreation. A major reason for this central policy
failure is the lack of a clear majority in the Parliament for a creative and effective policy. This is inherent
in the NL political situation, in which neither progressive nor conservative parties can achieve majorities
making coalition governments inevitable. As a result, governments always try to find a balance between
conflicting socio-economic interests and pressure groups, and always try to avoid conflicts with major
groups in society or that support parties in Parliament. In such a situation break-throughs can be achieved
only by powerful alliances of NGO’s such as Nederlandnatuurlijk (see Question 2.2). Aware of its weak
performance, the national government tries to delegate the provision of non-commodity outputs as much as
possible to regional and municipal governments. But these are also based on delicate coalitions and so also
cannot act as effective and stable providers. Because they are largely dependent on the governments’
performances, especially in the purchase of land from the farmers, the nature organisations can only join
the national alliance to mobilise the public for a more aggressive policy, including higher budgets for
landscape and nature. Water boards are quite effective and stable providers of water management. But they
tend to be too stable and need a lot of time to add to their basic tasks of flood prevention, agricultural water
management and waste water management the new task of water management for landscape, nature and
recreation. On the other hand, consumers are willing to pay more for local public goods or club goods than
for national or pure public goods (2001). Therefore, arrangements for provision by water boards may
appear more effective and stable, if the boards succeed in improving their image of rigid water authorities
by a more democratic policy and a broader bundle of public services. Unlike the governments, the water
boards have rather good relationships with farmers, which is indispensable in involving them again (or
more) in provision of the land-based non-commodity outputs.
Equity within NL
37. Equity has domestic and international implications. Domestically an equal distribution of social
costs and benefits of negative and positive externalities can be important for regions and individuals and
even generations (2001). In Question 1.1 it has already been mentioned that in NL the various farming
activities and their externalities are quite unequally distributed over the regions. Apart from the huge
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concentration of glasshouses near Rotterdam, the western part of NL has less intensive agriculture so it
suffers fewer negative externalities compared to the eastern part with its huge concentrations of cattle, pigs
and poultry. But the western part is more urbanised and has far less provision for landscape, nature and
facilities of rural recreation. To alleviate this inequality would probably take decades, so it will also
concern the next generation in the western and eastern parts of NL. A most vital and persistent inequality
between the two parts of NL is related to water management. The western part bears the highest social
costs for safety against flooding, the eastern part for desiccation caused by one-sided agriculture-oriented
management. A delicate issue is the inequality of costs and benefits between individuals with high and low
incomes. Low incomes tend to bear a bigger part of the social costs of the negative externalities than high
incomes. The latter can afford houses and recreation facilities remote from polluted and degraded
agricultural areas. On the other hand, high incomes pay more taxes so contribute more to the direct
provision of landscape, nature and environment for recreation than low incomes. But high incomes also
tend to attach more value to these public goods and consume more of them than low incomes. So, the
overall balance of equity is difficult to calculate when there is a mixture of negative and positive
externalities!
Equity between NL and trade partners
38. According to the OECD background document, countries may gain from more trade (OECD,
2001). However, if there is a bundle of both positive and negative externalities involved, which are not or
only partly internalised, the effects of trade on the welfare of each partner are difficult to estimate. Even a
careful analysis cannot change the subjectivity of estimating social costs and benefits of negative and
positive externalities. The best approach would be a national information campaign followed by a national
inquiry on the basic options:
 “considering current national agricultural activities with their positive and negative
externalities, do they benefit or harm your personal welfare?”
 “If these activities would internalise all externalities as follows (brief scenario for each main
activity), would it benefit or harm your personal welfare?”
39. Assuming that such an information campaign and national inquiry were to be organised (for
example by the national alliance of NGO’s for a nature offensive) and the result dominated by a majority
preference for a consistent internalisation of all externalities, the welfare effects are estimated of the
agricultural export production of NL for Germany (D), the main importer of NL- agricultural products
within the EU (table 4).
Table 4. Effects of current NL-export production for main trade partner Germany (D) on welfare in
both countries and the world.
Main NL export
commodities
NL -sum of
externalities
11
D- sum of
externalities12 NL-welfare13 D-welfare14
Global
Welfare
Cheese, potato, vegetables,
flowers, pig, poultry negative positive Decrease decrease Decrease
40. The result is quite evident: current export-oriented agriculture in NL is both negative for its own
welfare as well as for the welfare of its importing neighbour-country D. However, if both countries would
decide to jointly internalise the externalities of their agricultural activities, D would increase production,
notably in the East, and NL would sharply decrease its production, and ultimately D would develop to
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become a net exporter of agricultural products to NL. As a result, joint production of agriculture in NL
would be restored to an overall positive result and joint production of D would be strengthened, which
would increase welfare in both countries and overall (Table 5). Most significant D- commodities for export
would be arable products, vegetables, pig and poultry which economically and ecologically would go well
together in the eastern states with a lot of relatively cheap land and labour. Reallocation of most of the
production of these commodities from NL to the East of D would suppress their negative externalities in
NL and strengthen their positive externalities in D and thus increase the welfare of both.
Table 5. Effects of possible D- net export production for main trade partner NL on welfare in both
countries and the world.
Main D export
commodities
NL-sum of
externalities11
D-sum of
Externalities12 NL-welfare15 D-Welfare16
Global
 welfare
Potato, vegetables, pig,
poultry negative positive Increase increase increase
International spillover
41. This term is scarcely used and is not defined in the background document. Probably, it means the
impact of internalising externalities by major agricultural exporters as NL for its trade partners all over the
world. Before expanding on this example, it should be stated that NL would only internalise the major
negative and positive externalities of its agriculture if the EU were to drastically reduce subventions and
protection of its commodity outputs, so liberalising agricultural trade. Then both the agri-food complex and
Parliament of NL would have to face the unprofitability of most farming activities in NL, because of the
excessive costs of labour and land, and co-operate to reallocate or de-intensify the activities. If EU and NL
were to do so, welfare in other EU-countries would increase in the same way as indicated for D. The
impact for trade partners of NL outside the EU will also depend on their degree of internalisation of
externalities. For example the United States, Brazil and Thailand would find no direct compensation for the
loss of export of their feed-stuffs to NL, because D and other EU-countries can feed their pigs and poultry
with their own feed-stuffs. But an associated decrease of welfare would be doubtful, if these partners also
consider the loss of negative externalities associated with intensive monocultures of soybean, maize and
tapioca. They may even increase their welfare, by using the opportunities of the liberalising world trade
and continue production of feed for export production of pig and poultry on own account.
!
42. This case study is intended to contribute to an in-depth analysis by OECD of the compatibility of
multifunctional agriculture and free trade. The actual and potential roles of market and policy in NL-
agriculture are analysed based on three questions, as proposed by OECD.
43. The first question is, to what extent is NL-agriculture jointly producing commodity and non-
commodity outputs? The answer is that in recent decades NL-agriculture has reduced non-commodity
outputs and has strongly increased negative externalities by intensification of its commodity production.
This has been encouraged by ample subventions and effective protection by the EU and NL-government.
Nevertheless, dairy and arable farming are still major joint producers of four land- based non-commodity
outputs, namely agro-historical landscape, nature, environment for living and recreation, and water
management.
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44. The second question is, to what extent does the market fail to incorporate the externalities of NL-
agriculture? The answer is that first of all both market and policy fail to internalise the serious negative
externalities of the various farming activities. The most clear examples are presented by horticulture
(outdoors and indoors) and pig and poultry farming. Apart from an ever smaller share in rural employment
these minimally land-based activities have no positive externalities to compensate for their major negative
externalities. So, their social costs are clearly higher than their private costs, but both the market and policy
fail to adjust accordingly. The main reason for market failure here is that most foreign and domestic
consumers are not willing to pay for commodity production with fewernegative externalities. This is
evident from the disappointingly low consumption of products marketed under integrated or organic labels.
The existence of market failure in the case of non-commodity outputs (positive externalities) appears from
strong signals of under-provision given by consumers as dairy and arable farmers decrease rather than
increase their joint production. A major signal is the recent initiative of the main organisations for nature
and landscape conservation, recreation and water management to call for a national offensive for better
protection and more provision of non-commodity outputs. They claim 0.30 million ha (15% of the
agricultural area) around the main cities for nature and recreation, on top of government plans for direct
provision. Another signal is the estimate of a commission for the water management in the 21st century that
at least 60.000 ha farmland is needed to manage the extra water quantities expected from global warming.
So, for water management also, NL is facing an under-provision.
45. The third question is, have non-governmental options been explored as the most efficient strategy
to solve this market failure? The answer is yes, but with the strong support of government, because
government is expected to determine the provision of more (or less) public goods. To compensate for the
ever falling joint production of landscape, nature and recreative environment, private and public nature
organisations have started providing them directly as an Ecological Main Structure. However, that is not
enough considering, for example the additional demands of the alliance of NGO’s. Without water
management NL would not exist, because most of the land is below or just above sea level. It was started
by settling farmers, but even from the Middle Ages, water boards had taken over responsibility and
management on behalf of the growing communities. These water boards have expanded their basic services
(safety for flood and agricultural water management) to include water purification and even nature and
recreation,  and they provide them as regional public goods or rather regional club goods. But they are still
failing in control of desiccation and precipitation peaks probably caused by global warming. So, in general,
the compensation policy of non-agricultural provision of the four land-based non- commodity outputs fails
to fill the gap between demand and provision. An alternative policy would be to reduce negative
externalities and underprovision of non-commodity outputs in one sweep by encouraging farmers to
convert from intensive monofunctional production to extensive multifunctional (joint) production. This
could be achieved by replacing subsidies and protection of commodity production by direct payments for
services concerning the four land-based non-commodity outputs. Initially these services could be paid for
by the EU and the NL-Ministry of Agriculture (“cross compliance”and “modulation”). Later on, nature
organisations and water boards could take over the payment of the farmers by imposing region-wise levies
to the consumers of the “regional club goods” (“regional population as a club for rural services with
obligatory membership”).
46. In addition there was the third question: what are the stability, equity and international spillover
effects of these arrangements? The answer for stability is that government and its dependent nature
organisations can become better providers of landscape, nature and a recreative environment, if a powerful
alliance of NGO’s can push them toward a more aggressive policy. Water boards have tended to be too
stable and need a lot of time to broaden their tasks to include water management for landscape, nature and
recreation. On the other hand, consumers are willing to pay more for local public goods or club goods than
for national or pure public goods. Therefore, provision  by water boards may be more effective and stable,
certainly if the boards succeed in improving their image of rigid water authorities with a more democratic
policy and a broader bundle of public services. Contrary to the governments, the water boards have rather
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good relations with farmers which is indispensable involving them again (or more) in the provision of
land-based non-commodity outputs.
47. Concerning equity between NL and its trade partners, current export-oriented agriculture in NL is
estimated to be negative both for its own welfare and for the welfare of its main import partner
Germany (D). However, if both countries were to decide jointly to internalise the externalities of their
agricultural activities, D would increase production, notably in its eastern states (former DDR) and NL
would sharply decrease its production, and ultimately D would develop to become a net exporter of
agricultural products to NL. As a result, joint production of agriculture in NL would be restored to an
overall positive result while joint production of D would be strengthened, which would increase welfare in
both countries. Concerning the international spillover, it is thought that NL would internalise the major
negative and positive externalities of its agriculture only if the EU were drastically to reduce subventions
and protection of commodity outputs, so liberalising agricultural trade. Then both the agri-food complex
and the NL Parliament would have to face the unprofitability of most farming activities in NL, because of
excessive labour and land costs. They would have to co-operate to reallocate or de-intensify the activities.
If the EU and NL were to do this, welfare in other EU-countries is expected to increase, as in D. The
impact for trade partners of NL outside the EU will depend on the extent with which they internalise their
externalities, too.
48. The overall conclusion from this case study is that free trade is not a threat but an indispensable
basis of multifunctional agriculture or rather multifunctional rural areas, and for cost-effective provision of
commodity and non-commodity outputs by farmers and other providers. However, if the EU did not
combine trade liberalisation with a coherent policy to internalise externalities, in countries such as NL
agricultural production would only intensify further with increasing social costs. Such an internalisation
policy should first of all mean effective laws and rules to prevent, or at least drastically reduce, negative
externalities. Subsequently, it would imply creation of markets for non-commodity outputs for an adequate
supply of demand maximally delinked from agricultural commodities, by farmers or non-agricultural
providers. So, based on this case study, the OECD is advised not to adopt the vision that multifunctional
agriculture can be maximally led by the market and minimally driven by policy. In contrast, it is proposed
to achieve multifunctional agriculture or rather multifunctional rural areas by a combination of a free
market and a strong policy. The concrete advice to OECD is, “to enhance global welfare by a free world
market of rural products for any producer and trader and to support it by a powerful international policy to
protect the environment, the consumers, the workers and both wild and domesticated plants and animals
against negative externalities”.
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NOTES
1. National employment = 7 million of which 0.25 million in agriculture (3.6%), rural employment = 1.0
million (25% in agriculture). In 1999 3.3% unemployed in NL, 9.2% in EUR 15. (100 000 NL farms in
2000, 2% with nature services, 4% with touristic services).
2. Since agriculture in NL generates more environmental pollution by excessive animal manure than by
excessive mineral fertilisers, the latter are not considered here. Since manure from various animal
production activities is spread all over the national farmland, mean mineral input/ha from manure has been
calculated over all 2 million ha as 43 kg P/ha and 300 kg N/ha. EU norm for N-excess input: at maximum
170 kg/ha from manure to keep nitrate in upper groundwater below 50 mg/l (currently NL is overall at the
norm, however in the south the level averages 80 mg/l). So overall excess N input from manure in NL is
300-170=130 kg N/ha (= 45% of total manure input). The shares of the separate animal production
activities in this N-excess input have been calculated in proportion to the total N-input of each activity.
3. P is far less a mobile element than N, but a little leaching or run-off of P already causes serious
eutrophication of surface waters. Since a EU norm for P-excess input is still lacking, an agro-ecologically
sensible norm is proposed: P-input/P-output= 1 at maximum (considering current P- soil reserves are
agronomically more than sufficient and ecologically even excessive). Overall, mean P-output by plant and
animal products = 28 kg P/ha (Boons and van der Meer, 1996). So, overall excess P input from manure in
NL is 43-28=15 kg P/ha (= 30% of total manure input). The shares of the separate activities in this P-
excess input have been calculated similarly to the N-excess input.
4. Acidification is known as a complex of damaging processes of weakly buffering natural habitats. Main
cause is deposition of acidifying gases such as SO2, NO2 and NH3 . Total acidifiying deposition in NL = 37
billion acidifying equivalents including 22 billion from inland sources. Ammonia (NH3) from animal
manure is the main inland source with 10 billion acid. equiv. (45% of inland deposition). This ammonia
deposition implies 2650 acid equiv/ha and this alone exceeds the NL norm for total acid. deposition (2400
acid equiv/ha) already by 10%.
5. Main greenhouse gases are CO2(=1 global warming equivalent), CH4 (21 equiv.) and N2O (310 equiv.).
Total NL emission = 235 billion CO2 equiv., share of agriculture =11%.
6. Farmers can sign contracts for joint or delinked production of nature (“agricultural nature” or “pure
nature”) according to almost 100 management packages varying in payment from 100 to 2 000 Euro/ha
(more info on: www.minlnv.nl, search “programma beheer").
7. Management costs of delinked production by nature organisations are estimated 1 000 Euro/ha on average.
8. A good is non-rival when it can be consumed by one individual without diminishing the consumption
opportunities of this good to others. So, nobody should be excluded from using this good because there is
no additional cost to accepting more users.
9. A good is congestible if its consumption negatively affects other users, but does not reduce the consumable
amount of the good.
10. A good is non-exclusive if it is physically or legally impossible or very costly, to exclude individuals from
consuming it.
11. See Table 1a-b
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12. D has the same or more positive externalities but far less negative externalities as NL (per ha of
agricultural area: NL=2 and D=0.9 heads of cattle; NL=12 and D=3 heads of pigs, NL=160 and D=90 kg
N-fertilizer, NL=5 and D=2 kg of pesticides). Especially in D-east (former DDR) the rural areas are so
extensively used and unemployment is so high (15-20%), that overall D even the sum of externalities of
flowers, vegetables and pig and poultry production is estimated positive.
13. Welfare of NL is estimated to decrease since welfare gain by export cannot compensate for welfare loss
associated with the negative sum of externalities of intensive export-oriented production.
14. Welfare of D is estimated to decrease, since welfare gain by import cannot compensate for welfare loss
associated with loss of extensive domestic production (with a positive sum of externalities) caused by
import.
15. Welfare of NL is estimated to increase since welfare gain by import added to the welfare gain by
internalising the negative and positive externalities can compensate for the welfare loss by less export of
commodities.
16. Welfare of D is estimated to increase, since the welfare gain by export is added to the welfare gain
associated with the intensification of domestic production.
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